What if the CSA had gone totally defensive?

Here is a "what-if" to ponder;
What if thew CSA had gone totally defensive right from the start, focused totally on lining their borders, building protections and fortifications to protect those borders and manning them, etc., - just totally focused on defending their country and keeping the Union from being able to invade.

Do you think they could have done it?
Do you think they could have done it successfully to the point where they would have won their independence or do you think the Union would have kept hammering to make a break through their defenses?
Do you think it would have caused it to last longer or would taking that stand make it easier for the Union to defeat them quicker?

I confess, I have not seriously pondered the possibilities at all, it's just something that came to mind and just thought I'd throw it "out there" for conjecture.

"focused totally on lining their borders, building protections and fortifications to protect those borders and manning them, etc., - just totally focused on defending their country and keeping the Union from being able to invade."

That was exactly Davis' strategy. Obviously it didn't work.

The South never did and never could have martialed the forces needed to defend 3500 miles of coastline and at least as much land border. Add to this the fact that much of the land border was nothing but a line on a map with no natural defenses and the fact that there were never more than 1,000,000 men at any one time in the CS forces (this works out to roughly 142 men per mile of border/coastline or one man for every 11 yards)and you can see pretty quick what an impossible task it was to defend every point.

I believe it was George Patton who said “Fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man” Patton almost literally cut his teeth on WBTS strategy and tactics. John Singleton Mosby (the grey ghost) was a frequent visitor to the Patton home when George was growing up.

Yes, if I could have deleted that topic after I posted it, I would have. The thought popped into my head and after I posted it and was actually reading it, I thought, "I know better than that."

There is no need to second-guess the thread. It's a perfectly valid question. Macreverie is quite right in his observation, though. Still, a mobile defense, forcing the Union to carry the offensive load, might well have succeeded in the long run. A mobile defense can work in the right political circumstances, as witnessed by North Vietnam and the Communist Chinese successes (two examples) in this century. It did not work in WWII, largely because the political aims of Germany and Japan were not attainable by a defensive posture.

Time was another factor, one thing they did not have a lot of, especially to build to some sort of defensive line even close to what might be required.

Speaking of time, I don't have enough to post much today. But I do want to point out that going totally defensive did not require physically defending every square inch of the border. From a practical perspective, the majority of the border line defended itself by being practically inaccessible to combat forces (I don't know if you've ever read the British military historian John Keegan, but he points out that actual combat is and always has been confined to relatively small areas by inherent geographical and climactic limitations). There was no need for a kind of Confederate Maginot Line. Time truly was of the essence for both sides. Was it possible for the Confederates to wait out the Federals by going wholly defensive? Could the Confederates afford to let a stalemate erode Union will to carry on? These are central questions worth exploring.

Ajhall wrote:

Time truly was of the essence for both sides. Was it possible for the Confederates to wait out the Federals by going wholly defensive? Could the Confederates afford to let a stalemate erode Union will to carry on?

That's what I was thinking about when the thought first came to mind whenever that was. I remember it was the first time I really read about Gettysburg, although I know the reasons for it, I remember thinking they shouldn't have gone there, they should have focused on defending themselves.

You take my illustration too literally

The "one man for every 11 yards" that I mentioned was of course simply to illustrate the point.

Davis overall strategy was defensive though. Obviously even HE would not have tried to line the his borders with troops but his defensive strategy was simply a failed one from the start.

I believe the confederacy had its greatest chance of success early in the war. A crushing defeat of the union army & a march on Washington would have given the British & French the excuse needed to get involved. 1st Manasas provided the greatest opportunity to acheive this goal in the entire war. The US capital was in panic & the army routed! Longstreet even began marching his troops north & was furious when ordered to stop this movement (The defenses of the capital would later become far to strong). Other opportunities would arrise but never again would the CSA have such a golden chance for total victory. In 1862 the confederates attempted a coordinated multi~front offensive & failed (Lee checked @ Sharpsburg & Bragg in Kentucky). I think that was the last great chance for victory. The emancipation proclamation would soon after end all southern dreams of international support.

Davis's defensive strategy was @1st a simple miscalculation. He believed the northern public wouldn't stomach the war for long. This strategy changed with the confederates combined offensives of 1862. However, they never had the manpower for multi~front type of offensives again & were forced to resort to defensive strategy with limited offensive strikes(like Gettysburg, the ANV needed fast results & could not occupy northern soil for long). Successful strategy used movement to take advantage of enemy weakness. The greatest southern victories combined both offense & defense (ex.Chancellorsville, 2nd Manasas). Southern fortunes declined as they lost offensive striking power & were forced to become reactionary. Lee understood this, but what could he do? The souths best chance for victory was a single great battle in which the nothern army was destroyed. Lee defeated his opponents many times, but was never able to trap & destroy them as he wished. Left on the defensive only...Lee knew the writing was on the wall!

"greatest southern victories combined both offense & defense"

I agree.

Davis strategy was defensive but he (and many other CS leaders including Jackson and Lee)favored offensive tactics. This was simply the reverse of what might have worked. That is, offensive strategy and defensive tactics (in other words force the superior numbers to attack you).

It is unfortunate that most of the South's leaders/generals (including Davis)had offensive tactics drilled into their heads at West Point and VMI and then went to Mexico and saw those tactics work wondrously well against a (usually) numerically superior enemy. They (including Davis, Lee and Jackson) simply failed to realize the vast difference a few seemingly minor technical innovations in artillery and especially musketry made. It took them two years to really understand that attacking Mexican conscripts armed with smooth bore flintlocks was simply an entirely different proposition from attacking American volunteers armed with percussion (and sometimes repeating) rifles! yankee generals were no better in this regard (maybe even worse; review the battles of Kennesaw mountain and Cold Harbor for a couple of late war examples) but they could replace the "cannon fodder" that they murdered in suicidal or near suicidal attacks. The South could not. I believe the only major CS general to really understand these facts (at least after the first year of combat) Was the much (but I believe unfairly) maligned Joe Johnston.

Macreverie, I think you're right on. I especially agree that Joe Johnston has not been treated kindly by many people. He was indeed one of the few who really knew how to work on the strategic and operational defensive, with the tactical offensive used only when it had a high chance of success.