Would Stonewall Jackson have made a difference at Gettysburgh?

If Stonewall had not been killed by friendly fire by his own men,prior too Gettysburgh,would he have made a big difference there,possibly a Confederate victory?

many feel that he would have taken cemetary hill on july 1st,never mind that union soldiers already were on the hill in force.ewell in the previous month did as well as jackson in winning at winchester and moving his men to the susquehanna river and july 1st.lee's line at gettysburg[the fish hook]would have been tough for anyone to win in my oppinion-no jackson would not have made a difference at the battle,but overall lee could have used him,he was missed.

jackson might have made a big difference durring the bristoe campaign but at gettysburg i dont see how.

Well kakman, he would have definately taken cemetary hill no question in my mind. But other than that, he might have asisted during the last two days.

union troops with cannon were allready on the hill he would have a tough time.the town would have messed with the attack.i disagree on that one

I believe Jackson would have made all the difference. Keep in mind that he lead one of the greatest divisions north or south (remember the Valley Campaign the year prior). Under Lee (during Chancellorsville), were 2 corps... one under Jackson, the other under Longstreet. Once Jackson was gone, Lee went to three corps, thus separating Jackson's corp into two under Richard Ewell, and A. P. Hill. This reorganization was the first error of the Gettysburg Campaign. Each of the three corps began moving north, screened by Longstreet and the Blue Ridge Mountain chain. This, in turn, resulted in the scattering of the Confederate Army.
As each component of Longstreet's corp was arriving, Ewell and Hill were already engaged for 2 days (the whole core of Jackson's corp). If he was there to lead his entire corp (under the 2 corp system from Chancellorsville), Jackson would have been on the field long before General John Reynolds (USA) arrived to put up any significant resistance.
This first day of battle would have had severe influence on the subsequent days' fighting to the point that Pickett's Charge may never have been needed, or ordered.
On the reverse side, with Lee moving north, Hooker (soon to be replaced by Meade), could've shot south and attacked Richmond long before Lee would have realized the situation on the Confederate Capital. This is one instance that Federal inactivity could have benefitted the north and ended the war far sooner than 1865 (Richmond was very lightly defended at the beginning of the Gettysburg Campaign).

jackson was a good general but who did he face in valley campaign-shields,banks,fremont hardly foeman worthy of his steel-why was reorganizing corps bad?.moving north lee sent ewell[who performed steller service]ahead into pa on purpose.hill and longstreet advanced almost together or least within striking distance of each other.longstreet had two divisions on field of gettysburg after 1 day not 2,picketts div guards rear will join this night.if only two corps lee probally would have done things differently and quite possible battle fought elsewhere i dont know about that one.-hooker had orders to keep his army between lee and washington so going to richmond not on table,although that would have been interesting to see what happens if he did,lee would have no choice but to call off invasion

i forget this question is hard to answer,with jackson alive the whole campaign plays out differently.yes he could have made a difference overall.i only see the battle at gettysburg and the fish hook lines and i just think nothing would change anything-but i dont really know for sure-im sorry for my 'for sure 'attitude.

I would say that in many battles after he was killed he may have made a difference, but not gettysburg.

Perhaps General Jackson may have talked Lee out of the folly of Picketts charge, thus saving thousands of young lives-for later battles?

jackson followed orders,i dont think he would talk lee out of the charge doesnt sound like his style.the culps hill assaults could have used his hands on approach.one of the great what ifs of the civil war.maybe jackson would have made a difference on culps.that fish hook line really bugs me,i wish lee had not gone a day three at gettysburg.

Jackson would have never let Lee make such a stupid mistake, period!!!!!!

Jackson usually went with what Lee thought. If Lee REALLY wanted to make the charge, Jackson would not have stopped him. Lee really wouldn't have to listen to him. Though he was a strong advisor to Lee, if Lee thought it best to use the charge, he would have done so even if Jackson didn't want him to.

Woops!! I forgot to log in!! Count that post as mine...

With both Generals Longstreet and jackson at him re the charge,Lee may well have listened to their joint common sense, and not gone ahead with it. Wise counsel from two Generals may well have swayed him. But, we can never know for sure i guess.

I agree with Piesinches in that Lee consulted with Longstreet and Jackson very much, if both of them had been against Pickett's charge I believe Lee would have listened. He knew that Longstreet was naturally a defensive commander and probably believed that it made Longstreet biased however, Jackson was an extremely aggressive commander, for him to go against an assault would carry more weight. Also, Ewell failed on many accounts during the battle, errors that Jackson would not have made. "Many mistakes had to be made in order for us to lose that battle, I made most of them." -Richard Ewell. I do believe Jackson would have made a significant difference in the battle.

What staggers me is that Lee could not grasp the fact that sending soldiers across open fields with no cover,straight into massed artillery,cannisters,and withering gunfire,was strategic madness. He must have known hed have fifty percent casualites by the time the hapless but very brave troops made that fence,how did he expect to attack the Union "stonewall"with half his force knocked out.? His ego and arrogance got the better of him,but considering many years later in WW1 thousands and thousands of young soldiers were sent to similar useless deaths by their Generals-doing the same crazy charges on heavily defended trenches-not much was learnt from Lees folly was there ?

I came to this post quite a bit after the fact (I'm new to this site), but the question intrigued me. In reading over the posts, I'm very impressed with the depth of thinking everyone brought. There is no simple answer to the question. History is not linear, there is no natural, fated progression from point A to point B. There are so many seemingly insignificant events that went into the final outcome that changing even one alters the whole progression of events.

This is MHO. Jackson was a very good general (up there with Cleburne and Forrest on the CSA side), but he wasn't flawless. He could be even more stubborn than Longstreet. As shown by some of his performances in the 7 Days, he could be sluggish. He was at his best in an operationally defensive role, and he had Lee's unwavering trust. He had a good ability to see the opportunities inherent in a given situation on a given field. Keep in mind (as one poster so rightly pointed out) the Valley Campaign was waged against vastly inferior Union generals. It was a wholly defensive operation, meant to occupy Union forces. Jackson suffered at least one tactical defeat in the Valley, but that was irrelevant to his overarching mission. He had Union forces chasing him all over the map trying to bring him to book, which was just what Lee wanted from him.

That said, Jackson would have been immeasurably valuable to Lee at Gettysburg. It's my belief that the entire operation was doomed to failure from the start, yet at the same time it made sense to the CSA if viewed merely as a raid to disrupt Union forces and stir up fear and doubt in public opinion. Once the armies came together, Gettysburg was fated to take it's place in history one way or the other.

Romanticism aside, I don't think Jackson could have taken Culp's Hill -- it's a naturally very strong defensive position, and Union commanders were well aware of its importance and strength. The Union generals there were not the incompetent fools Jackson faced in the Valley, or even Chancellorsville. The Union Gettysburg lines were at least as strong as CSA lines at Fredricksburg (and remember, the Union came very close to breaking through Lee's right in that battle, but none of their leaders seemed capable of exploiting, or even recognizing, the vast potential there). I think Jackson's biggest potential impact could have been at the Roundtops. His strengths were ideal for this field. There is every reason to assume he would have been more aggressive than Longstreet in pushing his advantage. But even if he succeeded in capturing the Roundtops, there is little chance it would have had a decisive impact. More than one analyst has pointed out the inherent inability of inflicting a "Cannae" defeat on opposing forces. It almost happened at Nashville, and it did happen at Vicksburg after a seige (though without decisive results). Meade was no Hooker. He was very competent and much underrated. He knew his position was strong, and he had a back-up (Pipe Creek). His Corps commanders and staff were, for the most part, equally competent. Reid has argued (convincingly, IMHO) that unless a commander had a set plan, explicitly communicated to his tactical subordinate commanders, to exploit a possible decisive break, any follow on pursuit and attempt to destroy their opposite number was inherently doomed to failure. Few CW general's -- Lee included -- were wired to think much past the immediate tactical situation. Once falling back, the defeated army usually diffused the attacker's strength, if through no other means than rear guard actions which forced the pursuing forces to halt and deploy in line of battle each time, slowing them and robbing them of initiative, while allowing the defeated general time to regroup his forces.

Long answer, sorry. So, I think Jackson could have made a difference in that he might well have broken the Union line at the Roundtops, but he would have run into another layer of defense. He may have prevented Pickett's charge, but that would only have created a tactical stalemate, which was not to Lee's benefit. It would, in fact, have trapped him in an untenable position. Long-term, the Gettysburg campaign would almost inevitably turned into a losing proposition for Lee and the CSA.

I do find it staggering that Lee thought his Day 3 attack had a snowball's chance after he so clearly saw what happened to Union forces assaulting his front at Fredricksburg. To me, Gettysburg takes a lot of the shine off Lee's sterling reputation. I don't think anyone's ever fully explained his massive blunder there. It's still too romanticized.

While the attack on the angle may have been ill-fated, most people try to give the impression that Lee ordered his men straight into the might of the Union line and that is that. Their motivation is either to make Lee appear as a bad commander or at least in that decision, or they are trying to romanticize the assault on the Union positions. When speaking of the charge on the Union lines, they make it sound as if that is all that happened on the third day of the battle.

There was however fighting for most of the morning on Culp's Hill and also a Confederate cavalry movement around the Union line. Both were intended to, if short of taking the enemy positions, draw troops away from the Union center and softening the position for the assault. Both attempts failed and the Union force remained. Also, due to a confused order, a Confederate battery was supposed to have saved much of its ammunition and follow the infantry in, however almost all their ammunition was used in the preliminary bombardment. If these cannons had carried out their initial purpose, it would have devastated the Union position.

The attack may still have been fool hardy however, I think it is important to note that Lee did have measures in place, that if successful would have made the attack on the Union position at Cemetery Ridge a plausible victory. The fact that the Confederate soldiers were able to break the first Union line of resistance attests to that fact. If the Unions had not had those reserves, in otherwords had they been sent to the fighitng on Culp's Hill or the other side to safeguard against the cavalry threat, the fighting may have gone much differently. I believe the Confederates did in fact have a chance at succeeding had their other plans worked that day.

Excellent and valid points. The CSA also had significant problems with the fusing on their artillery ammunition, a quality-control problem that was never really solved. This limited the potential impact of their artillery during the assault.

As you point out, it is very important to remember that the frontal assault did not happen in a vacuum. There was much going on elsewhere. It's also vitally important to remember that Meade far outnumbered Lee, and he possessed the interior lines. He was not a commander likely to get caught with his pants down. I doubt there is much chance the assault could have had a decisive impact. Local success, yes, decisive no. The Union forces were far too powerful and (finally!) decently lead to have been overwhelmed by a numerically and logistically inferior force.

I've seen some very interesting studies looking at the minutiae of the Confederate attack, and the powerful impact seemingly insignificant things (like a rail fence, or a tiny defilade) had on the progression of the assault. It all points to an assault that had little chance of even tactical success. Of course none of this was likely within the scope of Lee's knowledge at the time; it's only coming to light almost 150 years after the fact.

I'd like to hear other takes on this. A question this raises for me is whether or not Jackson would have felt as reluctant as Longstreet in carrying out the attack? I don't know enough about Jackson to make an educated assumption.

I would say Jackson was excellent on defense but he was also know to be an aggresively minded commander. My assumption is that Jackson would have opted against Pickett's charge and intsead tried something more along the lines of what Longstreet wanted. Redeploy the army to a new locale that favored the Confederates. Jackson liked messing with the Union army and catching them split and or on his own terms, (think Valley Campaign, Chancellorsville, and even 2nd Manassas). I believe he would have been in favor of re-situating the army or trying a wide flanking action rather than a direct frontal assault.

As you pointed out, the Yankees had an excellent position and Jackson would have most likely realized that. With the speed that he was known for, Jackson could have had his Corps to a new location very quickly. Well, the danger there however is that it would have left Longstreet's Corps out for the pickings. However, Meade was known for being extremely cautious. Being that he failed to press any sort of attack on the retreating Confederates even in their worn state shows his reluctance. Had he pursued them, the South may well have lost the war in the next few days after Gettysburg. That's a whole other topic though. My point is that not knowing where Jackson was(Stuart's cavalry were present by the third day and could have screened his movements), Meade would not have committed to an attack on Longstreet. So another action would have been forced later, but on ground of the Confederates' choosing.

But that's just my two cents, sorry for the long post.

Thanks for the excellent, thoughtful answer. I believe you're absolutely correct when you say that one of Jackson's great abilities was getting inside his opponents heads and driving them nuts. I also agree that Jackson would very likely have proposed a wide flanking around the Union left, perhaps even wider than the Roundtops. He certainly had the tactical skill to pull it off. If he was at his sharpest, and get his troops in position as early as Lee hoped, we can reasonably see where he might have a major impact on the course of events. Once Meade realize how badly his left flank was dangling and he moved to cover it, chances for meaningful tactical victory started to slip away.

It seems less likely Jackson could have had a significant impact on the Union right. Much as Ewell has been raked over the coals for essentially "not being Jackson", the Union right was a very strong position, especially given the Union tactical advantages (high ground, terrain ideally suited for defense, adequate unit commanders, interior lines, numerical and logistic superiority, etc), and would have been a much tougher nut to crack. This is especially true in looking at late Day 1, Day 2 operations when Stewart was a factor only because of his absence.

I have a different thought about Jackson�s impact on the battle. If we look at the first time Jackson and Lee teamed up together during the last part of the peninsula campaign there is documentation of Jackson�s stead fastness on following orders to the point of not engaging in a near by battle when the troops under his command may have made a decisive difference. With Lees� orders of not to engage until troops could be massed in the invasion leading to the first day at Gettysburg the battle may have ended in a skirmish with Jackson breaking off and following Lee�s orders. This may have put the battle in a completely different location to who knows what end. To take this thought a little farther in looking at the way Jackson moved his troops they were always screened by calvery. We see this in the valley campaign were it was a big part of his success. If that tactic had been used the first engagement would only have been a calvery engagement. Then imagine Lee taking this information and pulled the army of northern Virginia back to his first position at the mouth of the Cashtown pass. The end out come could have been a total reversal. Jackson�s only input to the battle as it happened would have been the following of marching orders of not to engage until massed, short of that the battle as it happened would have very little change except as stated before the 3rd day charge may not have take place due to objections from both Longstreet and Jackson.

Very good points. It helps to remember that the initial point of contact involved Heth's detachment running into Buford's cavalry. Heth was responsible for pushing things to the point of no return. You're absolutely right that Jackson might very well have backed off, understanding the terrain was hardly favorable once the Union began fortifying what became Culp's Hill, and that might have been a good thing for the CSA.

Jackson understood how to use cavalry, at times at odds with Stewart over how to handle situations. That Stewart was off on his little ride, one wonders how that might have affected the way Jackson might have handled things. It doesn't seem likely Jackson would have pushed things on Day 1 without cavalry to get a feel for the lay of the Union forces.

I see from your log in that you're a guest. Why not become a member? We'd love your regular input. I also see you seem interested in the Iron Brigade. That very fine unit could be the subject of many interesting threads. I've heard of a new book analyzing the Iron Brigade's role in Day 1 of Gettysburg -- it might well have saved the day for Meade.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I seem to remember that Heth ordered in his division without first getting permission from Hill. He thought that the yankee cavalry were militia at first, then just a detachment of dismounted cavalry, then realized he was tangled with the Union army. If this is true, then Jackson wouldn't have made the call to stay out of the fight because he wasn't there. You could argue he would have been with the head of the column and therefore made the decision. I would say that would be the variable. If Jackson had been at the head of the column he would stopped and waited for Lee's command. If he was not and was where Hill was, then it seems likely the engagement would still have occurred because Heth made the decision to attack.

Aside from that though, there is another interesting variable. I believe as someone pointed out earlier, the Confederate Army was only split into three corps after Jackson's death because Lee felt that noone could adequately lead those men like Jackson had so he split them up. If Jackson were still alive, and the Confederate Army was still divided into two corps, the order of march could have been much different.

You're correct on all counts. I'd mentioned on another thread that AP Hill was suffering from the lingering effects of a relapse of prostatis (a male urinary tract problem), almost certainly resulting from a case of gonorrhea or syphilis contracted in his days as a West Point cadet. It laid him up at a time when Lee really needed him. He let his subordinate units get away from his control, thus Heth getting drawn into a conflict Lee did not want. Heth did indeed fail to understand right away that he was facing a force much more skilled then militia. Buford did a phenomenal job of using his cavalry force as dismounted infantry, which slowed Heth (and the rest of Lee's forces) just enough for Meade's forces to consolidate where they did. You rightly point out the difficulty in drawing conclusions on what Jackson would or would not have done, because the entire order of battle would have been different, with different units in different places. The reorganization after Jackson's death had subtle but far reaching consequences that are not readily apparent even now unless one takes the time to properly evaluate the seemingly insignificant variables, as you obviously have, that lead to events playing out as they did. Jackson is enough of an enigma (at least to me) that I find it hard to realistically imagine what he might have done. But it sure is an interesting mental exercise.

I too find Jackson captivating. Right now I am 100 pages into Life and Campaigns of Lieutenant General Thomas J Stonewall Jackson by Dabney. (I can't remember his first name at the moment). Very good book that really gives amazing information about Jackson. It was written very soon after the close of the Civil War by a close confidant of Jackson, who had access to many of the documents of the day! I would suggest it, but make sure you have a dictionary close by!!

No.
The only way he could have made a difference was to disobey Lee's orders or talk him out of some of the Confederate actions.
Lee's Folly was to let his troops string too far out. Once the first engagements began, Lee should have proceeded and taken the high ground on both Round Top Mountains, held those positions, then waited if need be for the split corps to catch up, before he further attacked and supported the held positions.
Lee had few choices after the strung out corps began fighting, either retreat back to Virginia or westward or push the Union back and take Gettysburg.
What is not realized here, is that the Confederacy had some discussion with the Maryland factions that be and wanted to impress them by getting close to DC and using Maryland forces to switch sides in support of the conquering Confederacy. Lee and Davis were aware of this fact. If he stopped advancing this looked bad for that cause.
The biggest mistake of the war was at the First Manassas, Bull Run. The Confederacy should have advanced and marched into Washington and held it.
That for the first time would have put the Confederacy on the Offensive and not the defensive.
If the Confederacy held DC at that time, it's a strong possibility that Maryland would have joined also, making it near impossible for the disorganized Union to take it back. All those thousands of lives would have been spared and the south would not have been plundered, burned and sold off by Sherman and carpetbaggers later. Negotiations would have broken out soon enough if the Confederacy captured Washington and this nations history would have been forever changed, good or bad...
Again, no, Jackson would have made little difference at Gettysburg, the mistakes were made before all the corps got together and caught up. Lee was too disorganized and not prepared that day for battle.

You raise some excellent points. It does seem to me Lee should have seized the Round Tops while he held the initiative. More realistically, capturing Culp's Hill, a task that may well have been Jackson's, would have changed the whole flow of events. Still, Lee faced a tough situation no matter how you look at it. The Army of the Potomac was finally in very competent if unspectacular hands. He was outnumbered and far from his base (strung out, as you put it) with no true cavalry screen to reconoiter or shield his movements.

I think you understate the impact of Washington falling to Confederate forces at that point in time. I think the capture of Washington would have resulted in the recognition of the Confederacy by the European powers. Once Lincoln was able to frame things in terms of an antislavery crusade, there was little chance any European power would risk the political impact in recognizing the CSA.

That said, the possibility of the Confederate forces after first Bull Run actually occupying Washington are remote in the extreme. To be sure, the Federal forces were disorganized and fleeing, but there were well lead units still offering significant resistance. The CSA forces were every bit as disorganized as the Federals immediately following the battle. As several commentators have pointed out, one of the most difficult tasks a CW army faced was the total destruction of the army opposing it. It happened 4 times that I'm aware of: Forts Henry and Donelson and Vicksburg, in both cases only after significant blunders by CSA general officers, and Vicksburg only after a prolonged siege; Franklin/Nashville and that was incomplete; and Appamatox. Full destruction of an opposing army required a level of tactical skill in officers and men that simply did not exist at first Bull Run. Lincoln's words said much: "It's true you are green, but so [are the Confederates] green, also." (forgive me if I didn't get the quote exactly right). Rear guard actions, even very small ones, forced a pursuing army to deploy into line of battle to meet the threat each time it occured (thus Thomas' success at Chickamauga). Once the Federal forces were back behind their fortifications, the strung out, inexperienced CSA forces would have no chance of pushing on to capture Washington.

Still, your ideas on what might have happened had the CSA taken Washington are very interesting and well thought out.

The posts on this subject are interesting. If Jackson had been at Gettysburg, Harrisburg would have been burnt to the ground. Jackson would have been arriving from greater distance than Longstreet. He would have arrived after Longstreet.

Jackson would not even tried to attack Culp's Hill or Cementary Hill. After the first day, Jackson would have sent at least two divisions to be utilized on Longstreets attack on day 2. Anderson always performed best when Longstreet told him what to do. He would have sent his division forward with a two brigade reserve, striking a narrower front. Pender's division would have also attacked instead of doing nothing after Pender was wounded. The Yankee line would have been breeched where Wright's Brigade made it to. With two extra divisions in the attack, the breech would have been blown open and the left flank of the Yankee army destroyed.

Instead of attacking Washington, Lee would have instead moved to take Philadelphia and Baltimore. What would have happened next, who knows.

In the end the only way the South could have won was via Emancipation of the slaves. This would have lead to large Confederate Armies with Black Troops, probable European intervention, and a severe loss in the will to fight. Many in the North would not fight Southern freeman and many abolitionist would have seen there mission as accomplished.

Lee in his letters suggested such. As Cleberne said, we can win our independence and end slavery, or we can lose our independence and slavery will end anyway. Slavery was not the real cause of the Civil War, but it was the reason the South lost.